# V5620. OWASP. Possible LDAP injection. Potentially tainted data is used in a search filter.

The analyzer has detected potentially tainted data used to form an LDAP search filter. This can lead to an LDAP injection if the data is compromised. LDAP injection attacks are similar to SQL injection attacks.

LDAP injection vulnerabilities belong to the OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks 2021: A3:2021-Injection.

Consider an example:

    public void Search()
    {
      ....
      string user = textBox.Text;
      string password = pwdBox.Password;

      DirectoryEntry de = new DirectoryEntry();
      DirectorySearcher search = new DirectorySearcher(de);

      search.Filter = $"(&(userId={user})(UserPassword={password}))";
      search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("mail");
      search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("telephonenumber");
      SearchResult sresult = search.FindOne();
      if(sresult != null)
      {
        ....
      }
      ....
    }

In this example, a search filter is formed to provide some personal data to a user with a valid username and password. The filter contains the values of 'user' and 'password' variables obtained from an external source. It's dangerous to use such data because this gives an attacker the opportunity to fake the search filter.

To better understand the attack, let's consider some examples.

If "PVS" is written in 'user' and "Studio" is written in 'password', we receive the following query:

    LDAP query: (&(userId=PVS)(UserPassword=Studio))

In this case, we get the expected data from the user and if such a combination of user and password exists, access will be granted.

But let's assume that 'user' and 'password' variables contain the following values:

    user: PVS)(userId=PVS))(|(userId=PVS)
    password: Any

If we use these strings in the template, we will get the following filter:

    LDAP query: (&(userId=PVS)(userId=PVS))(|(userId=PVS)(UserPassword=Any))

Such a search filter guarantees access even if an attacker enters an incorrect password. This happens because LDAP processes the first filter and ignores (|(userId=PVS)(UserPassword=Any)).

To prevent such attacks, it's worth validating all input data or escaping all special characters in user data. There are methods that automatically escape all unsafe values.

Here's the code fragment containing an automatic escaping method from the Microsoft namespace — 'Microsoft.Security.Application.Encoder':

    public void Search()
    {
      ....
      string user = textBox.Text;
      string password = pwdBox.Password;

      DirectoryEntry de = new DirectoryEntry();
      DirectorySearcher search = new DirectorySearcher(de);

      user = Encoder.LdapFilterEncode(user);
      password = Encoder.LdapFilterEncode(password);

      search.Filter = $"(&(userId={user})(UserPassword={password}))";
      search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("mail");
      search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("telephonenumber");
      SearchResult sresult = search.FindOne();
      if (sresult != null)
      {
        ....
      }
      ....
    }

The analyzer also considers public method parameters potential sources of tainted data. This topic is covered in detail in the following article: "Why you should check values of public methods' parameters".

Consider an example:

    public class LDAPHelper
    {
      public void Search(string userName)
      {
        var filter = "(&(objectClass=user)(employeename=" + userName + "))";
        ExecuteQuery(filter);
      }

      private void ExecuteQuery(string filter)
      {
        DirectoryEntry de = new DirectoryEntry();
        DirectorySearcher search = new DirectorySearcher(de);

        search.Filter = filter;
        search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("mail");
        search.PropertiesToLoad.Add("telephonenumber");
        SearchResult sresult = search.FindOne();
        if (sresult != null)
        {
          ....
        }
      }
    }

The analyzer issues a warning of low level of certainty when analyzing the 'Search' method for the 'ExecuteQuery' call. PVS-Studio detected tainted data passed from the 'userName' parameter to the 'filter' variable and then to 'ExecuteQuery'.

In this case, we can use the same protection method.

    public class LDAPHelper
    {
      public void Search(string userName)
      {
        userName = Encoder.LdapFilterEncode(userName);
        var filter = "(&(objectClass=user)(employeename=" + userName + "))";
        ExecuteQuery(filter);
      }

      private void ExecuteQuery(string filter)
      {
        DirectoryEntry de = new DirectoryEntry();
        DirectorySearcher search = new DirectorySearcher(de);

        search.Filter = filter;
        ....
      }
    }

This diagnostic is classified as:

CWE-90 OWASP-5.3.7